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HARNESSING MARKET FORCES IN NATURAL 
RESOURCES MANAGEMENT: LESSONS FROM THE 
SURF CLAM FISHERY 
Franz Thomas Litz* 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Like many environmental problems, the overexploitation of ocean 
fisheries poses questions concerning the allocation of commonly 
owned resources. Common resources are often overexploited because 
individual consumers receive all of the benefit of exploitation, while 
the costs are shared by everyone. Since only a small percentage of 
the world's resources are privately or government owned, the chal-
lenge is to manage unowned resources in a sustainable and efficient 
manner. Through environmental regulation, government assumes this 
management role. 
In its management capacity, government must choose between 
various regulatory instruments. Although economists have for dec-
ades advocated the use of market-oriented instruments in environ-
mental regulation, l only recently has a trend emerged toward actual 
development and implementation of market approaches by Congress 
and the Executive branch.2 Theoretical evidence indicates that mar-
* Executive Editor, 1993-1994, BOSTON COLLEGE ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS LAW REVIEW. 
1 In general, "market-oriented" approaches to managing common-property resources involve 
the creation of a system of quasi-property rights. If those quasi-property rights are transferable, 
an artificial marketplace is created in which normal market forces lead to efficient, environmen-
tally friendly results. See generally Robert N. Stavins, Incentive-Based Environmental Regu-
lation: A New Erafrom an Old Idea?, 18 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1 (1991); Bruce A. Ackerman & Richard 
B. Stewart, Reforming Environmental Law: The Democratic Case for Market Incentives, 13 
COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 171 (1988); PROJECT 88-HARNESSING MARKET FORCES Tf) PROTECT 
OUR ENVIRONMENT: INITIATIVES FOR THE NEW PRESIDENT (R. Stavins ed., 1988). 
2 For an analysis of four tradable permit programs implemented by various agencies, see 
Robert W. Hahn & Gordon L. Hester, Marketable Permits: Lessons for Theory and Practice, 
16 ECOLOGY L.Q. 361 (1989). 
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ket approaches result in a more efficient allocation of a given resource 
than traditional command and control approaches.3 Since, however, 
experience in the practical implementation of market-approaches is 
limited, there remains much to be learned about the design of mar-
ket-based regulatory instruments. 
In this regard, the individual transferable quota system (ITQ mar-
ket) currently in operation in the Atlantic surf clam and quahog 
fishery provides a revealing case study. An examination of prelimi-
nary data from the surf clam fishery indicates that the ITQ market 
approach has eliminated many of the economic inefficiencies which 
formerly plagued the common-property fishery. Further, the ITQ 
market has also succeeded in maintaining a stable surf clam popula-
tion. 
This Comment undertakes to explain the practical success of the 
Atlantic surf clam ITQ market. Part II of this comment provides the 
background for an analysis of current market approaches. It begins 
with an application of the "tragedy" theory to the fishery commons.4 
A brief history of traditional regulatory approaches to fisheries man-
agement follows. Part III examines the theory of market-based man-
agement of fisheries in the form of an individual transferable quota 
market (ITQ market). Part IV reviews the first ITQ market imple-
mented in the United States by National Marine Fisheries Service, 
the Fishery Management Plan for the Atlantic Surf Clam and Ocean 
Quahog Fishery. Finally, Part V summarizes the conclusions that may 
be drawn from this case stUdy. 
II. BACKGROUND 
A. Applying a "Tragedy" Theory to the Fishery Commons5 
"Tragedy of the commons" is the phrase Garrett Hardin used in 
1968 to describe the overexploitation of common property resources.6 
In The Tragedy of the Commons, Hardin was primarily concerned 
with the problem of conservation of commonly-owned resources.7 
Hardin demonstrated the tragedy phenomenon through the now-fa-
3 See generally T. TrETENBERG, EMISSIONS TRADING: AN EXERCISE IN REFORMING POLLU-
TION POLICY (1985); Robert N. Stavins, Harnessing the Marketplace, EPA J., May-June 1992, 
at 21-25. 
4 See infra notes 15-35 and accompanying text. 
5 For a more complete explanation of the tragedy of commons phenomenon as it applies to 
fisheries, see James A. Wilson, A Test of the Tragedy of Commons, in MANAGING THE COMMONS 
97-111 (G. Hardin & J. Baden, eds., 1977). 
6 Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243, 1244 (1968). 
7 See id. 
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mous example of a commonly-owned pasture destroyed by overgraz-
ing.8 Hardin's hypothetical pasture is overgrazed because individual 
herdsmen, each seeking to extract the greatest possible benefit from 
the pasture, "race" to feed their cattle on the pasture before their 
competitors' cattle are able to consume it.9 Although the best long-
term strategy is to maintain grazing at a sustainable level, no individ-
ual herdsman takes measures to conserve the pasture, since any 
benefit accrues to his competitors who continue to graze the pasture.lO 
Thus, the pasture commons is not conserved. 
In addition to the conservation problem described by Hardin, 
fishery economists have since identified an economic problem in the 
fishery commonsY The economic "tragedy" of the commons fishery 
takes the form of overcrowding and overfishing.12 In general, overfish-
ing occurs as fishermen employ more and more equipment to capture 
a declining fish population.13 Thus, an expanded "tragedy" theory has 
emerged, with both conservation and economic components.14 
In the common fishery context, the individual fisherman has no 
incentive to conserve. Indeed, if an individual refrains from taking 
any amount of the resource, he has no way of ensuring the other 
fishermen do the same. This phenomenon may be explained by the 
fact that the fisherman possesses no enforceable rights in the uncap-
tured resource.15 Since rights in the resource vest only upon capture,16 
each fisherman has every incentive to catch as much fish as he can, as 
fast as he can. Anything one individual does not take will be taken by 
another fisherman. The resulting race to the resource leads directly 
to the conservation tragedy of the fishery commons: the decline and 
ultimately the extinction of the exploited fishery resourceP 
Of course, collectively the fishermen in a given fishery have an 
incentive to sustain the fish population over the long run.18 To sustain 
the fishery stock for a given species over time, the reproducing popu-
8 See id. at 1243-48. 
9 See id. 
10 See id. 
11 Peter H. Pearse, From Open Access to Private Property: Recent Innovations in Fishing 
Rights as Instruments of Fisheries Policy, 23 OCEAN DEV. & INT'L L. 71, 73 (1992). 
12 See id. at 74. 
13 See id. 
14 See id. 
15 See Pierson v. Post, 3 Cai. R. 175 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1805). This case is widely recognized as 
establishing in the United States the legal doctrine of ownership in ferae naturae. The doctrine 
provides that ownership rights vest upon manucaption of the wild animal. Id. at 177. 
16 See id. 
17 Wilson, supra note 5, at 99. 
18 See id. 
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lation must be maintained at the scientifically optimum level.19 This 
can only be accomplished if all fishery participants agree to limit their 
catches to a sustainable level.20 Absent collective agreement by all 
fishermen, however, the individual fisherman has no incentive to cur-
tail his efforts in order to preserve the reproducing stock, because 
there is no guaranty that all of the other fishermen will follow suit.21 
The tragic result is the ultimate demise of the fish population and the 
end to the fishermen's livelihood. 
Separate from the conservation "tragedy" of the fishery commons, 
the economic "tragedy" may take its toll even before the noticeable 
decline of the fishery stock.22 The economic problems of the fishery 
commons include overcrowding, vast overcapitalization23 of the fishing 
industry, and suboptimal harvesting24 of the resource.25 Together, 
these inefficiencies make fishing in the commons less and less profit-
able over time.26 
Overcrowding of a fishery occurs as fishermen employ increasing 
numbers of boats and invest in more equipment to harvest the fishP 
Since every fisherman has a right to as much of the fish as he can 
catch, in competition with all the other fishermen, there is a strong 
incentive to enlist as many tools as possible to increase the catch.28 
"Thus, fishing fleets expand, even if they are already big enough to 
take the available catch."29 
Since the conservation tragedy of the commons often works a de-
cline in the fish population at the same time overcrowding occurs, the 
economic problems are exacerbated.so While fishermen invest in new 
vessels and equipment, declining fishery stocks mean a diminishing 
19 While the optimum size of the reproducing stock cannot be precisely pin-pointed, it can be 
determined to be within a given range of population sizes. See id. at 98. 
20 See id. There is a socially optimal level of fishing effort that corresponds with the socially 
optimal level of reproducing stock. Id. 
21Id. 
22 Id. 
23 Overcapitalization occurs when the value of fishing vessels and equipment exceeds the 
potential value of the catch. See MID-ATLANTIC FISHERY MANAGEMENT COUNCIL IN COOP-
ERATION WITH THE NAT'L MARINE FISHERIES SERVo AND THE NEW ENGLAND FISHERY 
MANAGEMENT COUNCIL, AMENDMENT EIGHT FISHERY MANAGEMENT PLAN FOR THE ATLAN-
TIC SURF CLAM AND OCEAN QUAHOG FISHERY 46 (1989) [hereinafter AMENDMENT EIGHT]. 
24 See infra notes 33-35 and accompanying text. 
25 Pearse, supra note 11, at 74. 
26 Id. 
27 Id. 
28 Id. With expanded fleets and higher capital costs come higher labor costs. Id. 
29 Id. (emphasis in original). 
30 See id.; see infra notes 15-21 and accompanying text. 
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available catch.31 In effect, increasing costs are incurred in order that 
the fisherman may take an ever-decreasing percentage of the total 
available catch per vessel.32 
Suboptimal harvesting is a second aspect of the economic "tragedy" 
of the fishery commons.33 Each species of fish has a socially optimal 
age for harvest.34 Ideally, a fish should be caught at the age which 
brings the highest price on the market.35 Thus, the individual fisher-
man has an incentive to wait for a given stock to mature before 
harvesting. Since, however, the fisherman who throws back immature 
fish runs the risk that his competitor will subsequently catch them, 
the fish are taken regardless of their maturity.36 Such premature 
harvesting results in a less desirable fish product, and a correspond-
ingly less-than-optimal market price for the fish caught.37 As a result, 
the profits of individual fishermen decrease.38 
Thus, the tragedy of the commons presents problems in both a 
decline of the fish popUlation and an inefficient allocation of fishing 
effort. Traditionally, only the conservation problem has been ad-
dressed by government regulators, and only with limited success.39 
The problem of inefficient allocation of fishing effort has been largely 
ignored under traditional approaches.40 
B. Traditional Command and Control 
Approach to Fishery Management 
Initially, fishery management efforts focused only on the conserva-
tion problem inherent in common property fisheries. 41 Through a 
"command and control"42 regulatory approach, fishery management 
attempted to protect fishery stocks from overexploitation. Until re-
cently, command and control management has meant fishing effort 
31 See Pearse, supra note 11, at 74. 
32 See id. 
33 Wilson, supra note 5, at 98. 
34 Id. 
3I5Id. 
36 See Pearse, supra note 11, at 74. 
37 See id. 
38 See id. 
39 See infra notes 41-62 and accompanying text. 
40 See infra notes 41-62 and accompanying text. 
41 See Pearse, supra note 11, at 74. 
42 Under command and control regulation, government determines the optimal environmental 
outcome, e.g., the total sustainable yield of a given fishery, and also orders the means by which 
the outcome is to be achieved. See THOMAS TlETENBERG, ENVIRONMENTAL AND NATURAL 
RESOURCE ECONOMICS 316 (2nd ed. 1988). 
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restrictions on the number of fish caught; the fishing seasons; the 
length of fishing trips; and the fishing equipment used.43 Only in the 
late 1970s did fishery management begin to restrict entry by new 
fishermen into fisheries.44 Yet effort restrictions, even when coupled 
with restrictions on entry, are generally thought to have failed.45 The 
continued decline of fishing stocks in most regulated fisheries can be 
explained by the failure on the part of fishery managers to address 
the economic component of the commons tragedy.46 
Prior to the 1970s, command and control management of fisheries 
meant restrictions on the amount of effort fishery harvesters could 
exert.47 For example, some fisheries were open only during certain 
seasons or times of the day.48 In addition to time limitations, some 
fishery management plans placed minimum size limits on fish to be 
taken, as well as on the total amount of fish that could be taken by all 
fishermen from the fishery.49 
The effort restrictions alone failed to prevent overcrowding and 
overcapitalization of the fisheries. 5O Even as fishery managers limited 
the times of day or the seasons during which fishermen could fish, and 
limited the types of fishing equipment fishermen could use, still more 
and more individuals entered the fisheries to compete for a declining 
available catchY Faced with intense competition in an overcrowded 
fishery, individual fishermen already operating within the fishery in-
vested in more equipment to bring in the catch more quickly. The 
result was an ever-worsening economic situation within the fishing 
industry. 52 
In response to the widespread decline of U.S. marine fisheries, 
Congress passed the Magnuson Fishery Conservation and Manage-
ment Act of 1976 (Magnuson Act).53 The Magnuson Act created eight 
43 Pearse, supra note 11, at 74. 
44Id. 
45 See id.; J.L. McHugh, Fisheries Marw,gement Under the Magnuson Act: Is it Working?, 21 
OCEAN DEV. & INT'L L. 255, 255--56 (1992); Morton M. Miller et al., Impressions of Ocean 
Fisheries Management Under the Magnuson Act, 21 OCEAN DEV. & INT'L L. 263, 265 (1992). 
46 See infra notes 146--48 and accompanying text. 
47 Pearse, supra note 11, at 74. 
48 See id. 
49 See id. 
50 See Miller, supra note 45, at 264-65. 
51 See id. 
52Id. 
53 16 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1882 (1988). The Magnuson Act was passed to provide "a national pro-
gram for the conservation and management of the fishery resources of the United States ... to 
prevent overfishing, to rebuild overfished stocks, to insure conservation, and to realize the full 
potential of the Nation's fishery resources," Id. § 1801(a)(6), and to "achieve and maintain, on a 
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Regional Fishery Management Councils,54 each responsible for the 
preparation and administration of Fishery Management Plans 
(FMPs).55 The Magnuson Act authorized the Regional Fishery Coun-
cils to limit access to fisheries,56 in addition to imposing traditional 
effort restrictions.57 
The addition of entry restrictions in FMPs has failed to remedy the 
economic problems prevalent in the fishery commons.58 Entry limita-
tions were unsuccessful in part because they were imposed only after 
fisheries were already overcrowded and overfished.59 In addition, in-
dividual fishermen still had incentives to replace their older vessels 
with bigger, more advanced boats.60 
Thus, in many cases the conservation problem was not alleviated 
by the imposition of entry limitations, since catch capacity continued 
to increase on the part of individual fishermen already operating in 
the fishery.61 Nor did entry restrictions adequately address the eco-
nomic problem of the fishery commons, since fishing costs continued 
to increase as benefits continued to decrease.62 The perceived failure 
of the Fishery Management Plans under the Magnuson Act led many 
to suggest market alternatives to address the fishery problems. 
III. MARKET THEORIES OF FISHERY MANAGEMENT 
In the late 1970s, fishery economists began suggesting an alterna-
tive to the rigid regulatory approach embodied in the Magnuson Act. 
They suggested a system of quasi-property rights in the fishery.63 By 
continuing basis, the optimum yield from each fishery," Id. § 1801(b). In short, the Magnuson 
Act sought to rectify both the problem of declining fish populations and the economic inefficien-
cies inherent in the tragedy of the fishery commons. 
54 Id. § 1802(23). 
55 A Fishery Management Plan (FMP) is a plan developed by the regional fishery management 
council. As an agency regulation, each FMP must pass through a period of public review and 
comment prior to being approved by the Secretary of Commerce. Id. § 1852(h)(l). 
66 Id. § 1853(b)(6). 
57 The Magnuson Act allowed for the closing of areas within the fishery, Id. § 1853(b)(2); total 
catch quotas, Id. § 1853(b)(3); and the regulation of fishing gear used, Id. § 1853(b)(4). See 
Katherine A. Marvin, Note, Protecting Common Property Resources Through the Marketplace: 
Individual Transferable Quotasfor Sur/Clams and Ocean Quahogs, 16 VT. L. REV. 1127, 1141 
(1991). 
58 See Miller, supra note 45, at 75. 
591d. 
fIJ Id. 
61 See id. 
62 See id. 
63 Pearse, supra note 11, at 76, citing D.G. Maloney & P.R. Pearse, Quantitative Rights as an 
Instrument for Regulating Commercial Fisheries, 36 J. OF THE FISHERIES RES. BD. OF 
CANADA 859, 8594i6 (1979). 
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allocating shares of the total available catch64 in the fishery, property 
rights proponents argue, much of the "tragedy" of the fishery com-
mons is eliminated.65 
Property rights systems, proponents argue, solve the conservation 
problem.66 Such systems eliminate competition between fishermen 
because fishermen may only catch those fish which "belong" to them. 
Thus, a property rights system removes the problem of a declining 
fish population, since fishermen bring in collectively only those fish to 
which they are given rights.67 
In addition, since property rights systems take the race out of the 
fishing harvest, many of the economic problems are solved.68 Facing 
no competition for their allocated share of the fishery stock, fishermen 
are able to allocate their fishing effort in the most cost-effective way.69 
In essence, property rights systems seek to eliminate the problems 
of the commons by dividing up the common resource, and allocating 
portions to individuals, thereby rendering it no longer "common."70 
Individuals purchase or are given shares in the resource, also called 
individual quotas,71 and thereafter possess a property interest in the 
resource that did not exist in the fishery commons prior to allocation.72 
The precise nature of this interest depends in part on the terms of 
allocation, including the length of time the right is to last, and whether 
that right can be modified in any way by fishery managers.73 
In individual property rights schemes, similar to traditional regu-
latory schemes, fishery managers set a quota offish that may be taken 
from the fishery, called the total annual catch (TAC).74 The TAC is 
set at a quantity of fish which allows for long term preservation of 
the total fish population.75 Thus, the TAC represents the most im-
portant control from the standpoint of conservation.76 Fishery man-
64 Total available catch is set at a level which allows for the stable preservation of a fishery's 
reproducing stock. See infra notes 33--35 and accompanying text. 
65 See Pearse, supra note 11, at 76; Anthony D. Scott, Conceptual Origins of Rights Based 
Fishing, in RIGHTS BASED FISHING 11,28 (Philip A. Neher et al., eds., 1988). 
66 See Scott, supra note 65, at 28. 
67 See id. 
68 See id. 
69 See id. 
70 See Pearse, supra note 11, at 76. 
71 See infra notes 79--81 and accompanying text. 
72 See Pearse, supra note 11, at 76. 
73 See infra notes 202-11 and accompanying text. 
74 See, e.g., infra notes 149--84 and accompanying text. 
75 See K. Marvin, supra note 57, at 1142. 
76 See id. 
1994] NATURAL RESOURCE MANAGEMENT 343 
agers divide up the TAC and make allocations to individual fisher-
men.77 
Individual fishery allocations, or individual quotas, can take several 
forms. The allocation may entitle its holder to a specific quantity of 
fish.78 Alternatively, the allocation may equal the right to take a cer-
tain percentage share of the TAC.79 Furthermore, individual quotas 
may be transferable, allowing fishermen to sell their rights, or pur-
chase additional rights as needed.80 In theory, transferability creates 
a market for individual quotas (ITQ market) which assures that only 
those fishermen who operate most efficiently will possess ITQs.81 
Since the individual fisherman has sole rights to a particular share 
of the total catch, several symptoms of the fishery commons disap-
pear. Conservation problems are addressed by the ITQ market 
scheme in a more direct, less obtrusive way. Since the ITQs collec-
tively represent the TAC, the fishery managers h~ve direct control 
over the amount of fish taken. In contrast, effort restrictions permit-
ting fishery managers to close off a fishery or regulate the permissible 
types of fishing equipment amounted to only rough controls over the 
TAC. 
In addition to preserving the long term sustainability of the fishery, 
the ITQ market also addresses the economic problems of the fishery 
commons.82 First, the element of competition between fishermen is 
less prevalent in a property rights scheme.83 Because the individual's 
77 The allocation of individual rights to fishery resources may be based on any number of 
criteria, including past effort in the fishery, past investment in the fishery, or rights may be 
auctioned. The method of distribution is only important at the start of an ITQ market, since in 
the long run trading of ITQs eventually results in the most efficient allocation of fishing effort, 
even if the initial allocation is not efficient. See Ian N. Clark et al., The Develapment and 
Implementation of New Zealand's ITQ Management System, in RIGHTS BASED FISHING 5, 134 
(Philip A. Neher et al., eds., 1988). 
78 See Clark et al., supra note 77, at 128. New Zealand later modified its ITQs, changing them 
from representative of specific quantities within the fishery to just percentages of the annual 
catch, which the managers had the power to alter without necessitating the costly buy back of 
ITQs on the part of the government. See id. at 128-29. 
79 See, e.g., the ITQ scheme developed for the Atlantic Surf Clam and Ocean Quahog Fisheries, 
at 50 C.F.R. § 652 (1991). See infra notes 149-86 and accompanying text. 
80 This Comment focuses on transferable individual allocations. Indeed, economists have ar-
gued that transferability is essential to the success of individual property rights schemes. See 
Scott, supra note 65, at 27. 
81 Transferability allows the more efficient fisherman to purchase the allocations of a less 
efficient fisherman. Such a transfer is in the economic interests of both buyer and seller, since 
the buyer is willing to pay the seller more than the seller would have yielded by using the ITQ. 
In this way, the most efficient fishermen ''buyout'' the inefficient fishermen. See generally id. 
82 See id. at 28. 
83 See id. 
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total catch is already predetermined on the face of the fisherman's 
ITQ, there is no longer any incentive to race other fishermen to the 
resource.84 Indeed, the individual fisherman has no legal right to the 
resource allocated to others, except through purchase of additional 
ITQs.85 Furthermore, under an ITQ market approach, the fisherman 
may focus his energy on best allocating his individual fishing effort 
based on his vessel capacity and labor resources.86 The rational fisher-
man will make such allocations as efficiently as possible.87 
Of course, the effectiveness of a given ITQ market in removing the 
incentives to race depends on the nature of the property rights con-
veyed.88 For example, if fishery managers unpredictably change the 
TAC, or the terms of the ITQ, a fisherman's operating decisions may 
be rendered useless. Moreover, if the TAC is changed frequently, 
leaving a high degree of uncertainty surrounding the ITQ's future 
value, an incentive arises to capture the allocation as quickly as pos-
sible, before the TAC is changed.89 Such uncertainty negates many of 
the potential economic advantages of the ITQ market.90 The holder of 
an uncertain ITQ will face a different type of race to the resource, a 
race against the fishery managers.91 
Second, in an ITQ market there is no need for government to 
regulate fishing equipment or vessels to insure a steady rate of har-
vest.92 The individual has an incentive to do so on her own. Under no 
time pressure to race the other fishermen to the fishery resource, the 
individual fisherman may determine on her own the most efficient 
means of bringing in her catch.93 This may involve spreading fishing 
efforts over an entire fishing season, providing industry processing 
plants with a steady flow of product.94 
Third, under a system of individual transferable quotas, individual 
fishermen have an incentive to take only those fish that will bring the 
highest price.95 Since the benefit of waiting for fish to mature accrues to 
84 See id. 
86 See id. 
86 See id. 
87 See Scott, supra note 65, at 28. 
88 [d. 
89 See id. 
90 See id. 
91 See id. 
92 [d. 
93 See id. 
94 Under traditional regulatory programs, fishery managers were forced to use effort restric-
tions to spread the annual catch over the entire year in order that processors were able to 
service the industry. K. Marvin, supra note 57, at 1142. 
96 See AMENDMENT EIGHT, supra note 23, at 68. 
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the individual who waits, fishermen under an ITQ scheme have an incen-
tive to wait until fish reach the socially optimal age before harvesting.96 
Fourth, under an ITQ market scheme, proponents argue there is 
less need for government enforcement mechanisms,97 a costly compo-
nent of fishery management.98 This assertion rests on the belief that 
the ITQ scheme provides sufficient economic incentive for self-en-
forcement.99 Each ITQ holder has an incentive to report incidences of 
poaching, since poachers in some cases may endanger the ITQ holder's 
property.l00 Also, in the case of allocations made in percentages of the 
TAC, ITQ holders stand to gain by protecting the long term growth 
of the fishery stocks from poachers.lOl 
IV. THE ATLANTIC SURF CLAM FISHERY: FROM REGULATORY TO 
MARKET ApPROACHES 
A. The Tragedy of the Surf Clam Commons 
The decline of the surf clam fishery fits the general paradigm of the 
overexploited common property resource.102 Although the surf clam 
fishery was not heavily fished until the early 1970s, by the mid-1970s 
the fishery began showing serious signs of overcrowding, overfishing, 
and overcapitalization. Ire In short, the fishery was falling victim to 
both the conservation problem and the industry to the economic prob-
lem associated with the commons fishery.l04 By some assessments, the 
surf clam fishery of the mid-1970s was headed for imminent destruc-
tion unless the government intervened.105 
Due to lack of demand, surf clams were not harvested in significant 
quantities until after World War II.106 A sharp increase in demand for 
96 See supra notes 33-35 and accompanying text. 
97 See Scott, supra note 65, at 28. 
98 See infra notes 177-80 and accompanying text. 
99 Scott, supra note 65, at 28. 
100 See id. 
101 See id. "It is generally not accepted that this willingness to prevent poaching and cheating 
exists." [d. at 29. The alternative to self-enforcement is an enforcement scheme the costs of 
which some have argued would outweigh its benefits. See id. Indeed, for the ITQ market 
discussed in depth below, regulators chose to keep in place many of the enforcement mechanisms 
which existed under the traditional management plans. See infra notes 179-80 and accompany-
ing text. 
102 See supra notes 6-14 and accompanying text. 
103 See Surf Clam and Ocean Quahog Industries Fishery Management Plan, 42 Fed. Reg. 
60437, 60457 (1977); K. Marvin, supra note 57, at 1136. 
104 See supra notes 6-14 and accompanying text. 
105 K. Marvin, supra note 57, at 1136 n.78. 
106 See Surf Clam and Ocean Quahog Fishery Management Plan, 42 Fed. Reg. 60437, 60457; 
K. Marvin, supra note 57, at 1136. 
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surf clams in the early 1970s created a boom in the surf clam industry. 
As a result, more and more fishermen entered the surf clam indus-
try. 107 
In 1976, surf clam stocks were already in decline,I°8 since individual 
fishermen had no incentive to conserve the surf clam populationy19 In 
1974, the surf clam catch was at an all time high of ninety-seven 
million pounds.110 Just five years later, in 1979, that amount had fallen 
to thirty-five million pounds.11l The total surf clam catch dropped nine 
percent in 1976, followed by another drop of forty-four percent in 
1977.112 By 1976, the surf clam fishery was overcrowded and overcapi-
talized.us New vessels continued to enter the fishery to exploit the 
commons resource.114 Because surf clam stocks are finite in the short 
run,115 as the number of vessels harvesting surf clams increased, the 
number of surf clams caught per vessel decreased.116 As a result, the 
profits of each vessel decreased.ll7 In 1978, the National Marine Fish-
eries Services (NMFS) estimated the total surf clam fleet capacity to 
be approximately 247 million pounds.118 That same year, the fleet 
landed only 40 million pounds.119 Overcapitalization continued in the 
surf clam fishery through 1987, when the NMFS estimated total net 
revenue loss in the surf clam industry.l2lJ 
In sum, the surf clam fishery suffered from declining stocks,I21 while 
1(11 42 Fed. Reg. 60437, 60457. 
HE AMENDMENT EIGHT,supra note 23, at 40. 
100 See supra notes 10-14 and accompanying text. 
110 AMENDMENT EIGHT, supra note 23, at 40. 
111 [d. 
112 [d. at 79. The decline in fishing stocks continued for two years after regulations were 
promulgated by the Secretary of Commerce implementing the first management plan for the 
surf clam fishery. See infra notes 584i3 and accompanying text. 
113 AMENDMENT EIGHT, supra note 23, at 49. 
114 See supra notes 594i0 and accompanying text. 
115 Surf clam stocks are finite at any given moment in time. K Marvin, supra note 57, at 1145. 
Surf clam stocks, of course, can increase in size over a period of years through natural repro-
duction. See AMENDMENT EIGHT, supra note 23, at 79. 
116 See AMENDMENT EIGHT, supra note 23, at 49; K Marvin, supra note 57, at 1147-48. 
117 K Marvin, supra note 57, at 1147-48. 
118 AMENDMENT EIGHT, supra note 23, at 46. 
119 [d. 
lal Net revenue is calculated by subtracting total costs, both variable and fixed, from the total 
revenue. [d. at 49. The NMFS estimated the net revenue for the fleet existing in 1987 only, and 
only for revenues in the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) which extends 200 miles off shore of 
the United States. [d. at 49. The number of vessels did not increase between 1976 and 1987, 
however, due to a moratorium placed on new entry. [d. at 11. The total available catch increased 
over the same period. [d. at 79. These trends support the proposition that the fishery remained 
overcapitalized throughout the 1976-1987 period. See id. at 49. 
121 [d. at 40. 
1994] NATURAL RESOURCE MANAGEMENT 347 
at the same time inefficient allocation of fishing effort depressed net 
revenues because of unnecessarily high fishing costsP2 This "tragedy" 
of the surf clam commons, and similar situations in other marine 
fisheries, spurred action by Congress.123 A series of regulatory meas-
ures followed, all aimed at addressing the problems of the surf clam 
commons. 
B. The Original Atlantic Fishery Management Plan for Surf 
Clams: The Shortcomings of the Traditional Approach 
When Congress passed the Magnuson Act in 1976, the surf clam 
fishery was suffering from a sharp decline in stocks, and the surf clam 
industry faced serious economic upheaval.124 Indeed, at its first meet-
ing, the Atlantic Fishery Council made the surf clam fishery its top 
priority.125 Accordingly, the first Fishery Management Plan (FMP) 
prepared pursuant to the Magnuson Act regulated the Atlantic Surf 
Clam Fishery.l26 The Surf Clam FMP underwent seven amendments 
until it was superseded by an ITQ market scheme in Amendment 
Eight.127 
The original Atlantic Surf Clam and Ocean Quahog Fishery Man-
agement Plan used both effort and entry restrictions to regulate the 
fishery.128 It set specific quarterly quotas for surf clams.l29 The original 
FMP also placed a one year moratorium on entry of new vessels into 
the fishery.13o 
122 [d. at 49. 
123 See infra notes 53--57 and accompanying text. 
124 AMENDMENT EIGHT, supra note 23, at 10. As adopted by the Secretary of Commerce, the 
actual regulations appear at Atlantic Surf Clam and Ocean Quahog Fisheries, 50 C.F.R. § 652 
(1991). 
125 AMENDMENT EIGHT, supra note 23, at 9. 
126 [d. 
127 [d. Amendment Eight is discussed in greater depth infra, Part IILC. 
128 42 Fed. Reg. 60437; The Magnuson Fishery Conservation and Management Act, 16 U.S.C. 
§§ 1801-1882 (1988). As its name suggests, the 1977 Surf Clam and Quahog Industries Fishery 
Management Plan also regulated the harvesting of ocean quahogs. 42 Fed. Reg. 60437. The 
regulations applicable to quahogs are of only limited interest in this discussion however, since 
the ocean quahog fishery has not suffered from overfishing, overcrowding, or overcapitalization. 
K. Marvin, supra note 57, at 1137. Thus, this Comment focuses on the practical success of the 
regulations as they pertain to the ailing surf clam fishery. Quahogs were included in the FMP 
as a preventative measure, since the Mid-Atlantic Fishery Council feared that quahogs would 
be increasingly exploited by the industry as a substitute for failing surf clam harvests. [d. For 
a discussion of the debate surrounding the inclusion of quahogs, see id. See also Sea Watch Int'l 
v. Mosbacher, 762 F. Supp. 370 (D.D.C. 1991) (AMENDMENT EIGHT challenged and upheld). 
129 AMENDMENT EIGHT, supra note 23, at 9. 
130 42 Fed. Reg 60438, 60486. The original FMP was implemented under the Magnuson Act's 
emergency action provisions. 42 Fed. Reg. 60438; 16 U.S.C. § 1855(e) (1988). 
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The first Surf Clam FMP set total annual catch quotas for surf 
clams and quahogs for the entire Atlantic fishery.13l These quotas 
were set at a level representing the maximum sustainable yield of the 
fishery.132 These total annual quotas were the central ingredient to the 
management scheme, because annual quotas insure that the fishery 
is harvested at a sustainable level.l33 
The original FMP and its amendments also placed a moratorium on 
entry of new vessels into the surf clam side of the Atlantic Fishery.134 
This prohibition of new entry, however, was imposed after the fishery 
was already overcapitalized. Crowding of the fishery had already 
resulted in inefficient harvesting. Thus, the moratorium had little 
effect on individuals within the fishery who continued to expand their 
fishing operations in an effort to catch a greater percentage of the 
declining fish population.l35 
Effort restrictions were also a central part of the original FMP and 
its amendments.l36 Effort restrictions limit the amount of time a vessel 
may stay out in a single fishing trip, as well as the seasons during 
which trips may be taken.137 The primary purpose of the effort restric-
tions was to insure that the surf clam catch could be spread over the 
entire year for the purposes of processing.l38 Without such time re-
strictions, surf clam catches would have been brought in for process-
ing all at once at the beginning of the quarter.l39 
As the original FMP was amended, the effort restrictions became 
increasingly complex.l40 The Regional Fishery Director, for example, 
was granted the power to set the number of six-hour fishing trips 
allowed for each vessel per quarter.14l Indeed, at one point this 
number was set at five trips per quarter.l42 Effort restrictions were 
changed often to accommodate changing conditions in the fishery.143 
The original Surf Clam FMP and its amendments succeeded in 
131 See K. Marvin, supra note 57, at 1141. 
132 The maximum sustainable yield is generally understood to be the point at which the 
number of mortalities and catch equals the number of newcomers to the fishery stock. See id. 
at 1142. 
133 See id. 
134 42 Fed. Reg. 60438, 60486. 
136 See supra notes 58-ti0 and accompanying text. 
136 42 Fed. Reg. 60486. 
137 [d. 
138 See K. Marvin, supra note 57 at 1143. 
139 See id. 
140 See id. 
141 50 C.F.R. § 652 (1991). 
142 AMENDMENT EIGHT, supra note 23. 
143 [d. at 18. 
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regenerating the surf clam stocks, adequately addressing the conser-
vation tragedy of the fishery commons.144 Total surf clam landings 
increased each year from the 1979 low of 35 million pounds to a 1986 
total of 79 million pounds, a 126% increase. 145 
The surf clam regulatory scheme, however, did not adequately ad-
dress the economic problems of the surf clam fishery.146 Although surf 
clam stocks were growing, they could not reach a size equal to the 
enormous capacity of the surf clam fishing fleets.147 Thus, in 1987, the 
NMFS estimated that total fleet capacity was significantly in excess 
of probable quotas.l48 Because of this excess capacity, and the eco-
nomic inefficiencies associated with the overcapacity, the Atlantic 
Council turned to an ITQ market scheme. 
C. Amendment Eight: An ITQ Market for the Surf Clam Fishery 
The Atlantic Surf Clam ITQ market is the first of its kind to be 
implemented in the United States.149 The architects of the market 
seek to eradicate economic overcapitalization150 in the surf clam 
fishery and at the same time allow entry of new vessels.151 In addition, 
managers were responding to criticism from the regulated community 
that effort restrictions were cumbersome and costly.l52 Thus, through 
Amendment Eight, managers seek to reduce overcapitalization, to 
ease the moratorium on new entry,l53 and to reduce the regulatory 
burden on fishery participants. 
In theory, an ITQ scheme renders unnecessary most of the cumber-
some effort restrictions found under previous management plans.l54 
144 [d. 
145 [d. 
146 [d. at 49. The economic problems spurred the preparation of the Amendment Eight ITQ 
system. [d. 
147 [d. at 46. 
148 [d. In 1978, the NMFS estimated the excess fishing capacity of the fleet to be 247 million 
pounds compared to a 40 million pound landing that year. [d. 
149 Similar plans have been implemented in New Zealand and Canada. See Clark et al., supra 
note 77, at 117. These plans provided important guidance to the designers of Amendment Eight. 
150 AMENDMENT EIGHT, supra note 23, at 49. 
151 A moratorium on the entry of new vessels had been in place since 1977 when the first 
Atlantic Surf Clam FMP was implemented. See supra notes 128-34 and accompanying text. 
From the outset, the moratorium had been the subject of much discontent in the fishery. Thus, 
when Amendment Eight was being designed, lifting the moratorium became an important goal. 
Amendment Eight replaces the moratorium with a system which may be accessed by purchas-
ing individual transferable quotas (ITQs). [d. at 11-12. 
152 [d. at 3. 
153 [d. at 11. 
154 See supra notes 93-98 and accompanying text. 
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Amendment Eight, for example, retains only those regulatory re-
quirements necessary to administer and enforce the ITQ market 
scheme.155 Thus, the Surf Clam ITQ scheme retained provisions for 
the TAC quota/56 a size limit on clams caught/57 and permit158 and 
reportingI59 requirements similar to those under previous surf clam 
management plansYi() 
Each year, the Mid-Atlantic Fishery Management Council (Council) 
recommends a total annual catch quota (TAC).161 The council makes a 
TAC recommendation for surf clams only after receiving public com-
ments and reviewing information on the health of surf clam stocks.162 
The Secretary of Commerce must then approve the recommendation 
and publish the TAC in the Federal Register for the number to go 
into effect.163 
Amendment Eight establishes a system of transferable allocations 
or individual transferable quotas (ITQs). Each ITQ vests in its holder 
a right to catch a certain percentage of the TAC.I64 The amount of surf 
clams a given fisherman may catch is thus determined by two factors: 
(1) the number of ITQs he holds; and (2) the TAC quota.l65 
To launch the ITQ market scheme, the NMFS made initial alloca-
tions to surf clam vessel owners based in part on past catch and in 
part on vessel capacity.l66 With each ITQ allocation, the NMFS issues 
166 See K. Marvin, supra note 57, at 1149--50. 
156 50 C.F.R § 652.21 (1991). 
167 [d. § 652.22. 
158 [d. § 652.4 (vessel pennit requirement); id. § 652.5 (processor/dealer pennit requirement). 
159 [d. § 652.6. 
160 See 47 Fed. Reg. 4270 (1982) (referring to requirements of old FMP). 
161 The TAC represents the total amount of surf clams which may be taken from the fishery 
in a particular year. 50 C.F.R. § 652.21 (1991). See AMENDMENT EIGHT, supra note 23, at 55-66. 
162 Under AMENDMENT EIGHT, the Council shall consider current stock assessments, catch 
reports, and other relevant infonnation concerning: 
"(i) Exploitable and spawning biomass relative to the optimum yield; 
(ii) Fishing mortality rates relative to the optimum yield; 
(iii) Magnitude of incoming recruitment; 
(iv) Projected effort and corresponding catches; 
(v) Geographical distribution of the catch relative to the geographical distribution of the re-
source; and 
(vi) Status of areas previously closed to surf clam fishing that are to be opened during the year 
and areas likely to be closed to fishing during the year." 
50 C.F.R. § 652.21(a)(1) (1991). 
163 [d. § 652(a)(3). 
164 [d. § 652.20(a)(6)(b). 
166 [d. 
166 [d. § 652.20(a)(l). The initial allocation is believed to have little influence on the long tenn 
economic effectiveness of an iTQ market. See Clark et al., supra note 77, at 134. Whether or 
not allocations are "released" to the fishery in an efficient manner, market transfers eventually 
effect an efficient distribution of ITQs. See supra note 77 and accompanying text. 
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cagel67 tags which must be attached to the SUIT clam cages at seaYj.'l 
To facilitate enforcement of the regulations, the cage tags must re-
main attached to the catch until sold to the process or. 169 The processor 
must then retain the tags for collection by the NMFSpo 
Once issued by the NMFS, ITQs and cage tags may be transferred 
between fishermen. 17l Transfer may take the form of an outright sale 
or a lease.l72 An ITQ holder can lease her rights to part of the TAC 
by merely selling her cage tags and retaining the ITQ allocation 
permit,173 
Transfer does not occur unhindered, however.174 Ten days before an 
ITQ holder may transfer her allocation, she must submit a written 
application to the NMFS.175 The transfer does not take effect until the 
purchaser or transferee receives a new ITQ permit from the NMFS 
after the application is processed.176 
Under Amendment Eight, NMFS enforcement of the surf clam ITQ 
market will take place largely at dockside.177 The less costly dockside 
enforcement was made possible through the elimination of most effort 
restrictions, which required enforcement at sea.178 To aid in dockside 
enforcement, vessels, processors and dealers must have a permit to 
participate in the surf clam fishery.179 Dealers and processors must 
also fulfill reporting requirements.180 
Under one reporting requirement, fishermen must firstly attach 
cage tags to SUIT clam cages when the catch is brought aboard the 
Commentators advised the NMFS that the surf clam market would get off to a more efficient 
start if the initial allocations had been sold or auctioned. See AMENDMENT EIGHT, supra note 
23 (letter attached to cover); K. Marvin, supra note 57, at n.24S. The Magnuson Act does not 
allow the Council to charge any amount greater than administrative costs. K. Marvin, supra 
note 57, at n.24S. 
167 A "cage," as defined in Amendment Eight, is an industry container with a standard unit of 
measure containing 60 cubic feet (1,700 L). 50 C.F.R. § 652.2 (1991). 
168 [d. § 652. 12(b). 
169 See id. § 652.12(a). 
170 [d. 
171 [d. § 652.21(f). 
172 See 50 C.F.R. § 652.21(f) (1991), which allows for the transfer of an ITQ allocation, in part 
or in full. The minimum number of cage tags which may be transferred in a transaction is five. 
[d. 
173 See id. 
174 See id. 
175 [d. 
176 [d. 
177 See AMENDMENT EIGHT, supra note 23, at 70. 
178 See id. For a description of the effort restrictions under previous management plans, see 
supra notes 136-43 and accompanying text. 
179 50 C.F.R. §§ 652.4 & 652.5 (1991). 
180 [d. § 652.6. See AMENDMENT EIGHT, supra note 23, at 57-S. 
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vesseU81 Secondly, vessel owners and operators must maintain daily 
fishing logs on board.l82 
Processors must take possession of the cage tags when they accept 
delivery of the catch, and keep the tags on hand for inspection by the 
NMFS.183 Processors and dealers must also submit weekly reports to 
the NMFS.184 These reports from fishery participants are checked 
against each other to ensure compliance.185 
Thus, Amendment Eight eliminates most of the cumbersome re-
strictions on fishing effort present under prior surf clam management 
plans.186 As a result, enforcement is accomplished on land rather than 
at sea. The question which remains is whether Amendment Eight has 
achieved a more efficient allocation of fishing effort through the ITQ 
market. 
IV. ANALYSIS 
A. The Ingredients for Success 
In theory, an ITQ market takes the "tragedy" out of the fishery 
commons by vesting quasi-property rightsl87 in fishery participants. 
In practice, however, the success of the artificial market depends 
largely on the nature of the property interest conveyed, and its trans-
ferability. Where, for example, a fisherman has a stable, valuable 
long-term right to part of the stock of a given fishery, that fisherman 
has an incentive to protect that interest through preservation of the 
fishery stocks.188 Furthermore, where the stable property interest is 
freely transferable, trading results in the most efficient allocation of 
fishing effort.189 Thus, any analysis of the practical implementation of 
an ITQ market must consider the nature of the individual property 
rights allocated, and the transferability of those rightS.l90 
181 50 C.F.R. § 652.12(a) (1991). 
182 ld. § 652.6(b). 
1ill ld. § 652.12(a). 
184 ld. § 652.6(a)(2). 
185 See id. § 652.6(a)(2). 
186 See supra notes 136-43 and accompanying text. 
187 These rights are called "quasi-property rights" because the fishery managers retain the 
authority to change the value of a given ITQ, or to scrap the market altogether. In the Surf 
Clam ITQ market, for example, managers may set the total annual catch (TAC) quota to zero 
if the available data support such a setting. In such an event, an ITQ would of course be 
worthless. See supra notes 161-73 and accompanying text. 
188 See supra notes 63-101 and accompanying notes. 
189 See supra notes 80-81 and accompanying text. 
190 See Clark et a!., supra note 77, at 133...,'35; Scott, supra note 65, at 26-7. 
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To date, very few analyses of the practical implementation of fish-
ery ITQ schemes have been conducted.191 Of course, the paucity of 
such studies is explained by the fact that so few ITQ markets exist. 
Indeed, only in the last decade have fishery managers around the 
world turned to artificial market schemes to achieve their goals.192 
One of the world's pioneer marine fishery ITQ markets was estab-
lished in New Zealand in 1986. In an analysis of the pioneer program, 
Ian Clark, Philip Major and Nina Mollett emphasize the necessity of 
free transferability.193 Clark and his colleagues also noted the impor-
tance of certainty in the property rights allocated.l94 These observa-
tions are particularly appropriate in the present analysis, given the 
similarities between the New Zealand program and the Atlantic surf 
clam ITQ market.l95 
Outside the fishery context, Robert Hahn and Gordon Hester have 
examined tradable rights schemes in environmental regulationYJ6 
Hahn and Hester attempt to explain why many tradable rights 
schemes have failed to achieve the efficiency and conservation goals 
predicted by advocates of such schemes.197 They point to restrictions 
on trading and administrative red tape to explain the gap that often 
exists between theory and practicey18 In other words, they attribute 
the failure of some artificial markets to interference with the free flow 
of market forces, usually by regulators themselves.199 
In addition to prior studies of tradable property rights,2°O this analy-
191 Indeed, a thorough search of relevant publications turns up only one such study, conducted 
relevant to the ITQ system in New Zealand. See Clark et aI., supra note 77. 
192 See Clark et aI., supra note 77, for a good discussion of New Zealand's first ITQ market 
set up in 1986. ITQ markets also exist in the fisheries of Norway, Canada, Iceland, and Australia. 
Scott, supra note 77, at 26. 
193 Clark et aI., supra note 77, at 133. 
194 See id. at 143. 
195 The New Zealand scheme is similar to the Atlantic Surf Clam and Quahog FMP, except: 
(1) the New Zealand scheme does not require that ITQ transfers be approved by fishery 
managers before transfers are effective; (2) the New Zealand plan initially allocated absolute 
fishing rights to fishery participants, but later switched to the percentage ofTAC approach used 
in the surf clam ITQ market. In most other respects, the plans are similar. See id. at 129-140. 
See supra notes 155-83 and accompanying text. 
196 See Robert w. Hahn & Gordon L. Hester, Marketable Permits: Lessons for Theory and 
Practice, 16 ECOLOGY L.Q. 361 (1989) [hereinafter Hahn & Hester, Marketable Permits]; Robert 
W. Hahn & Gordon L. Hester, Where Did All the Markets Go? An Analysis of EPA's Emissions 
Trading Program, 6 YALE J. REG. 109 (1989)[hereinafter Hahn & Hester, Where Did All the 
Markets Go?]. 
197 See Hahn & Hester, Where Did All the Markets Go?, supra note 196, at 109-10. 
19B See Hahn & Hester, Marketable Permits, supra note 196, at 404-05. 
199 See Hahn & Hester, Where Did All the Markets Go?, supra note 196, at 152. 
200 See Clark et al., supra note 77. 
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sis relies on data on the surf clam fishery available from the National 
Marine Fisheries Council.201 The results to date indicate that the surf 
clam ITQ market is a success. ITQ trading has been robust, and many 
vessels have left the fishery, reducing overcapitalization. Further-
more, surf clam stocks are in a stable condition. 
B. The Nature of the Property Right Conveyed in the ITQ 
In order to best simulate the conditions of the open market in an 
artificial ITQ market, the ITQ must convey a certain and definite 
property right.202 Accordingly, the holder of an ITQ must be reason-
ably certain of its value. Without a definite property right, the ITQ 
holder does not have the incentive he needs to plan investment and 
savings.203 Thus, whether or not a system of transferable rights will 
achieve efficient results depends at least in part on the certainty of 
the property right allocated.204 
In the surf clam ITQ market, the fishery managers have ultimate 
control over the value of the ITQ. Using its power most drastically, 
the NMFS205 as fishery manager may choose to scrap the ITQ market 
entirely through amendment of the FMP.206 Presumably, the ITQs 
allocated to fishery participants would be worthless in such a situ-
ation. Although it is unlikely that Amendment Eight will be aban-
doned entirely, the prospect does serve as a reminder that the gov-
ernment, in its discretion and through its democratic processes, may 
interfere with the operation of the artificial ITQ market in a variety 
of ways.207 
Most significantly, the NMFS possesses the authority to change the 
201 The author would like to thank Myles Raizin of the National Marine Fisheries Service in 
Gloucester, Massachusetts, for providing the data herein. 
202 See Clark et al., supra note 77, at 128-29; Scott, supra note 65, at 28; See also Hahn & 
Hester, Where Did All the Markets Go?, supra note 196, at 116--17 (discussion of how indefinite 
property rights in EPA's Emissions Trading Program led to its failure). 
200 The idea of a definite property right is the very foundation of any artificial tradeable 
property rights market. As discussed supra notes 15-17 and accompanying text, uncertainty 
promotes a race mentality among fishery participants. The economic tragedy of the commons 
occurs where the individual's share is determined by how quickly she captures the resource. 
204 See Clark et al., supra note 77, at 116-17; Scott, supra note 65, at 28. 
205 The NMFS, in cooperation with the Atlantic Fishery Council could revise the surf clam 
fishery management plan so as to scrap the ITQ market, provided the Secretary of Commerce 
gives his or her approval. 
206 See supra notes 126--27 and accompanying text. 
200 Indeed, since the ITQs do not represent any absolute property right, it is unlikely that 
they give rise to protection under the Takings Clause of the Constitution. See K. Marvin, supra 
note 57, at 1160. Marvin points out that the NMFS has specifically rejected the idea that the 
ITQ represents a property right in the sense of the Fifth Amendment. [d. at n.252. 
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total annual catch quota each year,208 and to thereby affect the value 
of the ITQs.209 A fifty percent reduction of the TAC results in a fifty 
percent reduction in the amount of surf clam which an ITQ holder 
may take.210 In her decision-making process, an ITQ holder must 
consider the likelihood that fishery managers will significantly lower 
the TAC each year. Thus, the actions of the NMFS in setting the TAC 
could either undermine or strengthen market participants' incentive 
to act in their own long-term interest. 
If the TAC fluctuates dramatically from year-to-year, investment in 
the fishery may become too risky. Conversely, if the NMFS continu-
ally sets the TAC at predictable levels, ITQ holders may plan their 
investment without surprises. In retaining ultimate control over the 
amount of surf clams a fisherman may take, the managers have a 
safety mechanism by which they can halt fishing when and if stocks 
decline.211 Nevertheless, the managers' actions must be tempered in 
light of the effects that any significant change in the value of an ITQ 
might have on the functioning of the market. 
In addition to the setting of the TAC, fishery regulators affect the 
operation of the ITQ market by imposing administrative costs on 
participants. Where, for example, each ITQ carries with it the re-
quirement to file reports with fishery managers, the net value of the 
ITQ is reduced by the cost of filing that report. Under Amendment 
Eight, ITQ holders are issued cage tags which must be attached to 
the catch aboard the fishing vessel. In addition, when the ITQ holder 
wishes to sell or lease his ITQ, he must submit an application for 
transfer. There is no requirement that the ITQ holder make reports 
to the NMFS, unless the holder is a dealer or processor.212 Thus, the 
only significant administrative cost directly attached to ownership of 
an ITQ is imposed when the owner transfers the ITQ.213 
Amendment Eight places the greatest reporting burden on the 
208 50 C.F.R. § 652.21 (1991). 
209 See supra note 164 and accompanying text. 
210 See supra note 164 and accompanying text. 
211 See supra notes 161-63 and accompanying text. 
212 See supra notes 180-82 and accompanying text. 
213 Initially, some commentators opposed any requirement to register a temporary transfer-
or lease-with the NMFS. Their opposition rested largely on the fear that such a requirement 
would hinder trading. The application procedure is essential to dockside enforcement however, 
since the NMFS must track cage tags from fisherman to processor. Furthermore, it appears 
today that the fears that the application would discourage trading were unwarranted: tempo-
rary and permanent trading has been strong. Telephone Interview with Myles Raizin, Plan 
Coordinator for the Surf Clam and Quahog FMP, NMFS, One Blackburn Circle, Gloucester, MA 
01930 (10/8193). 
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land-based surf clam processors and dealers.214 Cage tags placed on 
the catch at sea may be traced to the processor on shore.215 Therefore, 
processors have an incentiv6 to accept only surf clams with valid cage 
tags. Vessel owners must keep a daily vessel log, including cage tag 
numbers used and the amount of catch,216 but they need not report 
these numbers to fishery managers. Fishery managers may inspect 
vessel logs at any time. Thus, most of the administrative costs of the 
ITQ market are imposed not on the market participants, but rather 
on the processors and dealers.217 
In sum, the value of a surf clam ITQ is dependent upon the actions 
of fishery managers. If managers seek to alter the TAC widely from 
year to year, or to increase administrative costs incident to ITQ 
ownership, the value of the ITQ will be less certain. On the other 
hand, responsible management of the ITQ market will preserve the 
ITQ as a definite property interest in the surf clam fishery. 
While the potential for market interference is real, to date fishery 
managers have not altered the total annual quota or the administra-
tive requirements appurtenant to ITQ ownership. Indeed, for the 
three years from 1991 to 1994, the TAC has remained unchanged at 
just under three million bushels of surf clams per year.218 There has 
also been no need to impose additional reporting costs on ITQ own-
ers.219 The result is a great degree of certainty in the property interest 
conveyed in the surf clam ITQ. 
B. Free Trade in the ITQ Market: Transferability 
In addition to a certain and definite property right, it is essential 
to the success of an ITQ market that the property interests be trans-
ferable.220 Indeed, the success of artificial property rights markets 
may be directly dependent on the extent to which transfer of those 
214 See supra notes 18~ and accompanying text. 
215 See supra notes 181-84 and accompanying text. 
216 See supra note 182 and accompanying text. 
217 Of course, processors and dealers may own surf clam ITQs. Still, the cost of reporting may 
be seen as incident to the processing or dealing aspects of their business, not as incident to ITQ 
ownership. 
218 Data available from Myles Raizin, Plan Coordinator for the Surf Clam and Quahog Fishery 
Management Plan, National Marine Fisheries Service, One Blackburn Circle, Gloucester, MA 
01930 (on file with the author). 
219 Telephone Interview with Myles Raizin, supra note 213. 
2ID See Clark et al., supra note 77, at 133; Hahn & Hester, Marketable Permits, supra note 
196, at 404; Hahn & Hester, Where Did All the Markets Go?, supra note 196, at 137. 
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rights goes unimpeded.221 In general, this is true because barriers 
prevent the transfer of an ITQ from less efficient fishermen to more 
efficient fishermen.222 Thus, in order that ITQs end up in the hands of 
those fishermen who can most efficiently bring in the catch, trading 
must occur freely and frequently.223 
As the final arbiter in regulatory programs, government regulators 
determine the degree to which rules and regulations interfere with 
the free functioning of the ITQ market.224 As Hahn and Hester have 
observed, government involvement through the imposition of trans-
action costs can have a stifling effect on trading.225 Also, where market 
participants are uncertain about the value of their rights, they are 
less likely to sell those rights, and to purchase the rights of others.226 
Furthermore, where the market regulators place direct restrictions 
on trading, the effect is likely to be fewer trades and a market that 
does not reach an efficient equilibrium.227 
In the Atlantic surf clam ITQ market, fishery managers have im-
posed costs on ITQ trading transactions.228 Any ITQ holder who 
wishes to sell or purchase an ITQ must submit an application form to 
the NMFS.229 The transfer application must include the names and 
addresses of the parties to the transactions, as well as the numbers 
of the cage tags to be transferred.230 Only after the NMFS sends its 
approval, along with a new or revised ITQ to the transferee is the 
transfer effective.231 Thus, transfer may not occur immediately, and it 
does not occur without some measure of red tape. 
It is difficult to characterize the transfer application process as a 
restriction on ITQ trading, however. More accurately, the application 
process is little more than a reporting requirement, designed to pre-
vent cheating in the fishery.232 Applications are denied only in those 
221 See Hahn & Hester, Where Did All the Markets Go?, supra note 196, at 152. 
222 See supra notes 63-101 and accompanying text. 
223 See supra notes 63-101 and accompanying text. 
224 See Hahn & Hester, Where Did All the Markets Go?, supra note 196, at 152. 
225 See id. 
226 See id. at 116-17. Inhibiting trade is yet another negative effect caused by uncertainty in 
the property right created in artificial market schemes. See id. 
227 See Hahn & Hester, Marketable Permits, supra note 196, at 404. 
228 See supra notes 174-76 and accompanying text. 
229 50 C.F.R. § 652.21(f) (1991). 
23°Id. 
231Id. 
232 The cage tags are the principal means for tracing the catch to its captors. See supra notes 
181-84 and accompanying text for a discussion of the role of cage tags in the dockside enforce-
ment scheme. 
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cases where necessary information is missing from the application 
form.233 Thus, honest transfers are made simply by completing the 
form and sending it to the NMFS for processing.234 
The transfer application process has not stifled actual transfers of 
ITQs in the surf clam fishery. To the contrary, trading has been 
strong.235 As Figure 1 shows, trading as a percentage of total ITQs 
reached a level of fifty percent in 1992.236 On average, twenty-five 
percent of all ITQs were traded each month from January 1992 to 
August 1993.237 It is of course impossible to measure how many trans-
fers would have occurred if transfer applications were not required. 
Figure 1 Transfers as a Percentage of Total Number of ITQs from January 1992 
to August 1993 
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Source: National Manne Fisheries Service 
In summary, the practical implementation and design of Amend-
ment Eight has resulted in a genuinely functional ITQ market. Even 
better indicators of the success of Amendment Eight are the data 
concerning the health of the surf clam stocks and consolidation of the 
fishing fleets to a more efficient level. Indeed, the true test of any 
fishery management plan is whether conservation and efficiency goals 
have been achieved. 
c. The Early Success of the Surf Clam ITQ Market 
Early results from the surf clam fishery indicate that Amendment 
Eight is a success in both conservation and economic efficiency re-
233 Telephone Interview with Myles Raizin, supra note 213. 
234 [d. 
236 Data available from Myles Raizin, supra note 218. 
236 [d. 
2:17 [d. 
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spects. Surf clam stocks remain stable and fishing fleets have consoli-
dated.238 Thus, the designers of Amendment Eight have succeeded in 
putting economic theory into practice, creating a system of transfer-
able property rights to manage a common property resource. 
Implementation of the surf clam ITQ market is on its way to ac-
complishing one of its central goals: reducing overcapitalization in the 
fishery.239 As Figure 2 shows, the number of vessels operating in the 
fishery has dropped over fifty percent, from 125 in 1990 to 59 in 1992.240 
The number of vessels operating in 1993 is estimated to be 37, a 
seventy percent drop from 1990.241 This drop may be attributed to the 
forces of the artificial ITQ market. 
Figure 2 Number of Vessels Landing Surf Clams by Year 1988-1993 
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Source: National Marine FISheries Service 
As predicted in theory, fishing outfits which are able to turn the 
largest profit on their ITQs will buyout those owners which are 
unable to realize profits as large. Assuming all outfits are able to 
obtain the same price for their catch at shore, the highest profits will 
go to those fishermen who operate with the lowest costS.242 The price 
ITQ sellers receive for their allocations necessarily exceeds the 
amount of profit they estimate they would have realized actually 
harvesting the surf clams. Over time, as trades are made, ITQs shift 
hands from the less profitable to the more profitable fishing outfits. 
As vessel fleets consolidate, surf clam stocks have remained stable. 
Indeed, the TAC quota has remained steady just under three million 
238 Telephone Interview with Myles Raizin, 8upm note 213. 
239 See supm notes 149-53 and accompanying text. 
240 Data availabie from Myles Raizin, 8upm note 218. 
241 Estimates based on data available from Myles Raizin, 8upm note 218. 
242 This is true since profits are whatever the fisherman has left after he sells his catch and 
meets his operating costs. 
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bushels per year since the market was put in place.243 Because the 
TAC is set by fishery managers based on data concerning the health 
of surf clam stocks, it is therefore a direct indicator of the condition 
of the stocks.244 
Finally, any assessment of the accomplishments of Amendment 
Eight must be made in comparison to the traditional FMPs in place 
prior to Amendment Eight. Because Amendment Eight did away 
with the cumbersome effort restrictions previously in place and lifted 
the moratorium on entry to the fishery, it deserves the greater praise. 
Fishermen now choose when to fish and what equipment and labor to 
use. Moreover, the dockside enforcement possible under Amendment 
Eight is significantly less costly than the at-sea enforcement required 
under previous management plans.245 
The conclusions which may be reached based on this preliminary 
data should not be overstated, however. Only three years of data are 
available, leaving open the possibility that the surf clam ITQ system 
may not succeed in the long run. In particular, it is still unclear 
whether the current land-based enforcement scheme under Amend-
ment Eight has been effective in warding offpoachers.246 And no data 
are currently available concerning cheating that may go on in the ITQ 
market by participants.247 
It is also unclear whether the artificial ITQ market will experience 
market failure.248 The potential exists, for example, for monopolization 
of the fishery if one participant succeeds in gaining control over a 
great majority of the ITQs. Available data do not indicate a monopoly 
is in Amendment Eight's future.249 Indeed, as Figure 3 shows, ITQ 
owners comprising the top ten percent of all owners hold forty-one 
percent of total ITQs.2°O Further, only three of the 108 ITQ owners 
own more than one percent of total ITQs.251 The ITQ owner holding 
the most ITQs controls only thirteen percent of the total.252 Thus, it 
243 The TAC for 1991 and 1992 was 2,850,000 bushels per year. Data available from Myles 
Raizin, supra note 218. 
244 See supra notes 161-63 and accompanying text. 
246 See supra notes 177-80 and accompanying text. 
246 See supra notes 177-80 and accompanying text. As discussed above, poaching is not seen 
as a major problem in the fishery by many. See supra note 99 and accompanying text. 
247 See K. Marvin, supra note 57 at 1142. 
248 See T. TIETENERG, ENVIRONMENTAL AND NATURAL RESOURCE ECONOMICS 53-4 (2nd 
ed., 1988), for a discussion of the inefficient results of a monopoly. 
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is not likely that monopolization will occur in the near future. Despite 
any remaining uncertainty, all available data indicates that the surf 
clam ITQ market is destined to remain a success, in both conservation 
and economic efficiency respects. 
Figure 3 Distribution of ITQ Ownership in August 1993 
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Source: 1993 National Marine Fisheries Service. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The Atlantic surf clam ITQ market has taken the "tragedy" out of 
the surf clam commons. The fishery that just five years ago was 
overcrowded and overcapitalized is on its way to economic efficiency 
while maintaining ecological stability. Fishery managers have suc-
ceeded in designing an artificial market in which the property inter-
ests allocated are certain and valuable. Transfer of those rights occurs 
relatively unhindered. If the preliminary results achieved are repro-
duced in the coming years, the surf clam ITQ market will undoubtedly 
serve as an important example for managers of commonly-owned 
resources, both within and without the fishery context. 
